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Introduction: 
 
In Minds, Brains, and Programs, John Searle sets out the Chinese Room argument, in 
which he argues against the notion that a given computer running a program can be said 
to possess a mind, or to engage in the act of understanding, and do so purely in virtue of 
the program being run. This thesis aims to demonstrate that Searle’s arguments against 
computer understanding are flawed, and that a computer instantiating the correct 
program could indeed be said to understand.  I will achieve this by defending the Chinese 
Room counterargument known as the systems reply against the points Searle raises 
against it. I furthermore argue that the correct standard for detecting a digital computer’s 
ability to “understand” is a modified version of the Turing Test. 
The structure of this thesis is first to present the Chinese room thought experiment 
as well as the systems reply against it. Second, I will deal with Searle’s direct reply to the 
systems reply, which is the memorization counter‐argument. Third, I will address Searle’s 
indirect arguments against the systems reply, such as the impossibility of deriving 
semantic meaning from syntactic manipulation. Having thus repelled the direct attacks 
against the possibility of the systems reply being correct, I will offer positive arguments 
that the ability to pass a properly‐conceived behavioural test is the best possible measure 
of understanding and the possession of a mind. I intend to make the case for a purely 
behaviourist test of understanding along the lines proposed by Turing, responding to 
Searle’s objections to this approach as appropriate. I will also respond briefly to the 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objections of other thinkers such as Ned Block and Stevan Harnad against the suitability of 
the particular Turing test version that I advocate in this thesis. 
Finally I will acknowledge those points of Searle’s paper which I believe to be 
correct and think are worth noting even as one accepts my conclusions, in particular with 
respect to the limitations of digital computers and the proper standards that should be set 
with regard to what is considered “information processing” in a meaningful sense. 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1  Overview of the Chinese Room 
 
 
Searle’s “Minds, Brains, and Programs” was intended originally as a response to a 
school of thought that he labels “Strong Artificial Intelligence” (Strong AI). According to 
this doctrine, “a computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the 
appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given 
the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.” 
(Searle, 1980, p 417).  
The second facet of Strong AI is that a computer whose program enables it to 
understand serves as an explanatory tool for human cognition as well: “In strong AI, 
because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools 
that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the 
explanations.” 
  In “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Searle targets some conclusions made regarding 
the story‐understanding program produced by Roger Schank and his colleagues at Yale 
(Schank & Abelson 1977). Searle chose this particular case as an example of a program 
that would be held up as being capable of understanding in order to illustrate that a 
program might produce adequate responses but still not understand in a meaningful 
sense.  
  The program in question was written with the purpose of imitating the human 
ability to understand a story. This ability was represented by giving the program the 
ability to first accept a given story as input, and then, when asked questions about that 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story, respond correctly even about information not explicitly given in the text. For 
example, says Searle, suppose one were to provide the program the following story: “A 
man went into a restaurant and ordered a hamburger. When the hamburger arrived, it 
was burned to a crisp, and the man stormed out of the restaurant without paying for the 
burger or leaving a tip.” Now if we ask the program “Did the man eat the hamburger?” it 
will presumably answer “No, he did not.” In this way, it duplicates the human ability to 
glean information from a story beyond its actual text. (Searle, p. 417) 
  Suppose that the program is successful enough to reliably produce plausible 
answers to such questions just as a human might. The proponent of Strong AI, says Searle, 
will then make two claims about it: 
1. That the machine can be literally said to understand the story and provide the 
answers to questions 
2. That what the machine and its program do explains the human ability to 
understand the story and answer questions about it. 
Searle says of these: “Both claims seem to be to be totally unsupported by Schank’s 
work, as I will attempt to show in what follows.” 1 
Searle then produces the Chinese Room, a thought experiment whose intention is 
to show that merely producing the same outputs as a human might under certain 
circumstances is not sufficient to demonstrate understanding of the topic at hand – or the 
possession of a mind more generally. 
 
                                                        
1 Searle notes that Schank himself does not advance either of these claims of his own 
work. 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1.1  The Original Chinese Room 
 
The Chinese room thought experiment goes as follows: suppose that someone were 
to write a book of instructions, and that this book contains English instructions . The 
instructions read “When you see the following symbol on a slip of paper, then respond 
with the following two symbols, unless it is the case that this symbol precedes it, in which 
case respond with these symbols. If instead the symbol is immediately followed by this 
one, then respond with this single symbol,” and so on and so forth. These instructions are 
in fact a set of rules which, if followed, allow the operator to receive as inputs slips of 
paper containing Mandarin Chinese characters and produce as outputs slips of paper on 
which are written the appropriate responses, also in Mandarin Chinese. The instructions 
are written such that it is not necessary for the operator to be able to read Chinese. In fact, 
the operator need not even recognize the symbols as Chinese characters, even as 
language. The instructions are thorough enough that the operator need only be able to 
visually distinguish one symbol from the other, without any deeper recognition. 
  Thus, equipped with these instructions, which we may imagine take the form of a 
book or filing cabinet, an operator could pass for a native Chinese speaker under the right 
circumstances. Specifically, suppose that we were to lock Searle, who neither speaks nor 
reads the slightest bit of Chinese, in a room with nothing but the instructions, a pen, and a 
few slips of paper. Through a slot in the door, a Chinese speaker slips pieces of paper on 
which questions are written in Chinese. Searle, receiving these, performs the appropriate 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series of steps from his instruction manual, and produces a slip of paper with a string of 
Chinese characters on it which spell out an acceptable response to the question of the 
person outside. Recall that Searle has no fluency whatsoever in Chinese, and has no idea of 
the nature of what he is doing. When Searle returns this slip under the door, the Chinese 
speaker outside reads what Searle has written and may conclude that inside the room is a 
man who understands how to read and write Mandarin Chinese.  
However, says Searle, it is obvious that the man inside does not understand 
Chinese in the least. The operator inside understands only English2, and is no closer at all 
to understanding Chinese than before stepping into the room. 
  This process, says Searle, is just the sort of thing that happens when we input a 
story and questions to Schank’s program: a series of characters arrives from outside, each 
character in turn is interacted with according to the complex rules laid out by the 
program, and a second string of characters is produced and sent back outside. Throughout 
this process, the computer has not the foggiest understanding of the meaning of its inputs 
or outputs. It merely performs its operations.  
  How can we be sure that the computer does not understand? The role of the 
computer in the story program is the same as Searle’s role in the Chinese Room: receive 
characters, follow rules, and produce characters. If Searle does not understand the inputs 
and outputs in the Chinese room case, then the computer cannot understand in the case of 
the story, because the computer has “nothing more than I have in the case where I 
understand nothing.” (Searle, p. 418) 
                                                        
2 … or whatever language the instructions may be printed in. 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 Thus, the first claim of the Strong AI proponent is refuted. The computer does not 
understand the stories given it, because Searle does not understand the Chinese questions 
given to him, and the computer has no more ability to understand in a given situation than 
does Searle. As regards the second claim, that the program explains human understanding, 
Searle holds it as obvious that the program is insufficient by way of explanation since the 
interaction of the program and computer does not produce any understanding and 
therefore naturally ought not to be supposed to reflect human understanding.  
The weight of this argument is not only that the same outputs can be produced in 
different ways, but also that no program will ever be sufficient to produce understanding. 
This is because no matter what instructions are provided to a machine, so long as they are 
defined in purely formal terms, as a program, they will be insufficient to produce 
understanding on the grounds that a human could also follow those instructions without 
thereby understanding anything.  
As an illustration of this last point, take the case of existing programs intended to 
replicate the textual output of a human, such as ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1965). ELIZA takes a 
given line of input from a human subject, such as “Hi Eliza, how are you?” and then 
processes this sentence (string of characters) according to the instructions in its program, 
and then produces a string of characters as output, such as “I am well. How are you feeling 
today?” According to Searle’s position, no matter how convincing ELIZA’s responses may 
prove to be, we should not assume that any understanding is taking place on her side of 
the conversation so long as the program’s responses are dictated by a set of formal 
instructions. We need only remind ourselves, says Searle, that any human could also be 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producing Eliza’s outputs by simply following those same instructions without thereby 
understanding either the inputs or outputs. 
 Suppose, for instance, that the Chinese analogue to John Searle, a Mandarin 
Chinese speaker who neither reads nor writes English, is given the Chinese instructions 
that are equivalent to the ELIZA program. Even if one were to have an extended 
conversation by slipping sheets of paper with English statements under the door to the 
locked room containing the Chinese person, and receiving appropriate responses on 
sheets slipped back under the door, it is evident that the Chinese person in the room does 
not thereby understand English in the slightest. Since the Chinese person did not 
understand English, and a digital computer executing the ELIZA program adds no capacity 
to understand that was not present with the human operator, then ELIZA does not 
understand. And so it goes for any formally defined program, claims Searle; none of them 
can understand, because any conceivable interaction they may have with humans can be 
described in a format analogous to the Chinese room. 
 
1.2  The Systems Reply 
 
I believe that the most logical place to make a stand against Searle’s thesis in the 
Chinese room is to defend perhaps its most straightforward and popular objection, the 
systems reply.  
The claim of the systems reply is that the ability to produce the correct responses  
shows that some system exists which does, in fact, understand. For instance, when Searle 
is in the Chinese room with his symbol‐manipulating instructions, although we grant that 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Searle himself does not understand Chinese, nevertheless the combination of Searle, the 
instructions and the inputs and outputs do understand Chinese. The argument is that we 
should not expect Searle to understand in the Chinese room case, because the role he is 
fulfilling in this computational system is merely that of the processor, and not the entire 
computer, which would also contain memory and other components. These components 
do not individually understand, but when considered as a total system, then they do 
understand. A favourite analogy of the systems reply advocate is to compare the Chinese 
room to a human brain: no single component of the human brain can be said to 
understand anything when taken in isolation. Nevertheless, the system of the brain as a 
whole clearly does understand. The operator in the Chinese room experiment is analogous 
to a part of the brain, while the entire room is analogous to the entire brain. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the operator does not come to understand Chinese. Rather, the total 
system of the room possesses whatever mental capacity is necessary to produce the 
correct responses. The combination of operator, program, and other components do 
understand. 
 
1.3  Definition of Terms 
 
Before we review Searle’s attack on the systems reply, let us define the terms. This 
paper is chiefly concerned with the question of whether or not an appropriately 
programmed computer can possess understanding. Searle defines “understanding” as 
implying “the possession of mental (intentional) states and the truth (validity, success) of 
these states.” He adds that for the purposes of his argument he is concerned only with the 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possession of these states ‐ as opposed, presumably, to the possession of such states as 
“consciousness” and the like (Searle, 1980.) He further clarifies intentionality as being that 
property of mental states whereby they are directed at or about objects and situations in 
the world. This means that beliefs and desires are intentional states while general 
depression or anxiety are not.3 What does an opponent of Searle’s position need to prove, 
then?  
Certainly there is one important detail about what does not need to be proven by 
an advocate of the systems reply: consciousness. One can subscribe to the systems reply 
without needing to demonstrate that an appropriately programmed computer is sentient, 
conscious, or self­aware. These three terms are nebulous and, often enough, difficult 
enough to define as to be themselves the subject of a paper. Fortunately, it is not necessary 
to involve them in the defence of the systems reply. All we need to attribute to the 
correctly designed program are mental states of a certain type. Therefore I shall 
endeavour to show that a properly programmed computer is capable of understanding, 
but not that it is conscious.4 
 
1.4  Against the Systems Reply 
 
Searle attacks the systems reply in two ways: First, his direct attack on the systems 
reply, and second, his argument that no amount of syntactic complexity will ever produce 
semantic meaning ‐ and therefore, he claims, no amount of mere programming will 
produce intentionality. This second argument, if accepted, also defeats the systems reply, 
                                                        
3 (From endnotes 2 & 3 of Minds, Brains, Programs) 
4 Though I have no objection to the possibility of a conscious computer. 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by entailing that any system based merely on the syntactic manipulation of symbols 
cannot attain intentionality. I will address each of these attacks separately. My response to 
the memorization reply is detailed immediately below. My response to the question of 
syntax and semantics is addressed in depth in chapter 2. 
 
1.4.1  The Memorization Reply 
 
Searle’s direct response to the systems reply is the memorization counterexample. 
Regarding suggestion that the system of the instructions plus the person instantiating 
them constitutes a mind that understands Chinese, he answers: Suppose that our operator 
took his book of Chinese character‐manipulation instructions and simply committed all of 
it to memory. The operator could then throw out the book (and leave the room), and 
simply be handed slips of paper with Chinese sentences and hand back slips of paper with 
Chinese responses – all the while having no idea that he is in fact receiving questions or 
giving answers, or even that it is occurring in the Chinese language. In this example, where 
the operator has memorized all of the instructions, it seems obvious that she does not 
understand any more than when she were following from a book, despite the fact that 
their mind now contains the entire “system”. Therefore the claim made by the systems 
reply advocate, that the system as a whole must understand, cannot be so. Is this really the 
case? Are there any significant problems with the analogy of the person having 
memorized the complete instructions? 
There are in fact several problems with Searle’s response. First, Searle’s reply is 
vulnerable to the suggestion that Searle does in fact understand Chinese both while in the 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room following instructions and also after memorizing them. All that he lacks in this case 
is the awareness of understanding Chinese. Typically, any time that a human understands 
how to do something, we are also aware of our understanding – but it does not seem to be 
a necessary property of understanding even in the sense of the word put forward by 
Searle. Searle states that in order to understand, one needs to possess a mind, but he does 
not stipulate that we need to have any particular awareness of the understanding taking 
place (Searle, 1980, p. 424, Notes). Thus one can still hold that Searle understands Chinese 
both in the normal case and after memorizing the instructions, and simply happens to be 
unaware of it in both cases.  
However, the reply that Searle does understand Chinese but is not aware of it is a 
problematic one, because it fails to respond to several of Searle’s illustrations of the 
Chinese room’s inability to convey understanding to the operator. For example, when we 
ask Searle a question in English and the same one in Chinese, even if he were to give the 
same response, the process occurring in his mind is very different in either case. When we 
ask Searle a question in English, he engages in thought, reflection, summons memories, 
weighs emotions, and produces a thoughtful reply. When we ask the question in Chinese 
characters, he merely performs a few feats of memory and careful mental operation and 
produces what are, to him, meaningless symbols. Even if one contends that in the latter 
case he has “understood” the Chinese questions asked of him without being aware of his 
doing so, it is still evident that there are important differences in the process taking place 
in Searle’s mind besides merely his awareness of them. This is a line of argument 
examined in more detail by Hauser5 and others. The response that I advocate here is 
                                                        
5 Hauser, L., 2002, ‘Nixin’ Goes to China’ in Preston and Bishop (eds.) 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slightly different: I believe that Searle’s memorization reply already has several major 
flaws as a valid counterexample to the systems reply. 
Recall that in order to demonstrate that, in the case of the Chinese room, no 
understanding on the part of any system external to the operator’s mind is taking place, he 
proposes a revision. In his revised example, the operator of the Chinese room program is 
not following written instructions from a book, but has instead committed them to 
memory. Since every part of the equation is contained within the mind of the operator, 
says Searle, and the operator still does not understand, then the systems reply is defeated 
as no system exists that can be said to understand. If one did exist, it would surely exist 
within the mind of the operator – and therefore the operator would have to also 
understand. Perhaps initially convincing, this argument leads to some difficult problems 
when subjected to careful scrutiny. It relies on certain intuitions on the part of the reader 
– misleading ones that conceal an important disanalogy, as I will show. 
First, it is possible to simply reject the assumption implicit in the memorization 
reply that it is self‐evident that the memorizer’s mind is the only one to consider. After all, 
the systems reply advocate proposes that a person running the Chinese room program 
creates a mind of sorts capable of understanding Chinese as a consequence of running it. 
Why would they abandon this attitude the moment the operator memorizes the 
instructions?  
In order for the systems reply to be coherent, it must be claiming that when a 
computational operation of sufficient sophistication and power (for example, enough to 
produce convincing, native‐speaker quality answers to questions in a human language) 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takes place, then there is at least a virtual6 mind in existence that is carrying out the action 
we call understanding. The underlying assumption of the systems reply in this case is that 
it is impossible to produce the outputs of a human speaker without thereby duplicating in 
some form the essential structure of human thinking required to understand. 
Furthermore, this essential structure that is duplicated cannot be reproduced without 
producing genuine understanding. How can this be reconciled with the case of a 
monolingual English speaker who has memorized the instructions of the Chinese room?   
In order to answer this question, I must first present the following example of a 
person memorizing a program to illustrate how a virtual mind may exist inside of a human 
brain. Imagine that, in addition to being able to perform simple arithmetic, I take it upon 
myself to utterly memorize the circuit layout and mechanical functions of a pocket 
calculator. I memorize the structure of every wire, every capacitor and diode, power 
source, conductivity, and all computer chips, and am able to imagine the entire system 
clearly in my mind. Now, if someone says to me: “Suppose I pushed the following sequence 
of buttons on a pocket calculator: ‘nine, zero, division, three, zero, equality symbol.’ – what 
would be the final display?” I can imagine the sequence of events: pushing the nine button 
completes a circuit which sends a current through a certain wire, which has a certain 
effect on the components of the processing chip, and then so on for all the keys. In the end, 
purely by imagining the layout and capabilities of the machine, I can produce the answer 
“The screen will display the configuration of opaque areas corresponding to the number 
                                                        
6 By “virtual mind”, I mean a mind that is neither a human mind nor an animal one. This 
category could contain minds such as those produced by digital computers, but naturally 
also includes minds such as the one put forward by the systems reply advocate in the case 
of the Chinese room. That is to say, a mostly artificial mind which may happen to include a 
human mind as a sub‐component. 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‘three’.” And, indeed, such is the depth of my memorization that my ability to simulate the 
calculator’s operations in my mind is never wrong. I always achieve the answer that the 
actual calculator would give. If I could achieve such a perfect simulation of the calculator, 
would it not be apt to say that, indeed, there exists a calculator of that specification in my 
mind – or at least, my brain? Let us remember that if we believe that mental states 
correlate to brain states, then it must be the case that in some sense, my brain now 
contains the effective structure of this calculator. My neurons and axons and so forth have, 
by dint of my memorization, formed themselves into some structure that is functionally 
equivalent to the actual calculator. It is simply the case that in order to input commands 
into this “calculator” which exists in my brain, it is necessary to first relay the commands 
to my conscious mind (by telling me which button presses I am to simulate), which then 
sends them into the calculator brain‐space and receives the correct response. If a person 
could genuinely perform this feat without ever producing an error, then it seems clear that 
their brain really does effectively contain a calculator of that type. 
How does this example relate to the case where Searle commits to memory the 
structure of the Chinese Room program? What happens when Searle tells the systems 
reply advocate to simply memorize the entire system? Recall the scale of the program in 
question. This program has the net effect of taking any written Chinese input and 
producing an appropriate response that a native speaker might give. This presumably 
includes questions about the past, about opinions, taste in art, mathematical problems, 
hobbies, employment, etc. In short, it must contain in principle at least as much 
information as an adult human can possibly convey verbally – and in addition to this 
information, it must include a framework to at least minimally simulate such things as 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emotional states, to remember previous parts of the conversation, and so forth, as well as 
including the Anglophone instructions. In short, it is a very large program. In fact, this 
program would need to contain the same order of complexity as is contained in a human 
mind, if we assume that humans are capable of verbally communicating information on 
the same order as they are capable of experiencing it in general.  
This is a program of staggering proportions, and would be perhaps the most 
ambitious computer program ever written if it existed today.  Certainly it would make the 
memorization of the hardware of the pocket calculator from before seem utterly trivial by 
comparison, even though memorizing even that “simple” device in the way I described 
would probably be beyond human ability. Thus, when I memorize the instructions from 
the Chinese Room case, I am memorizing the formal structure of an entire personality, 
including a lifetime of memories, likes and dislikes, a certain quickness of temper (or lack 
thereof), a field of knowledge, a sense of humour, goals, desires, etc.7 If a person could 
actually commit all of these things to memory, then, just as in the case of the person who 
memorizes the mechanical workings of a calculator, my brain would contain a structure 
that is functionally equivalent to the brain of another human, or at least a significant 
portion of one. If I could, indeed, always produce convincing, consistent answers to the 
written questions I received, then it seems it would be fair to say that there is a mind that 
understands Chinese – and that it is not my mind – but rather the virtual mind that exists 
in my brain, in precisely the same way that the calculator in the brain of our first case can 
be said to really exist. Margaret Boden (1988) makes a similar argument: that confusing a 
person with a brain is a category mistake on Searle’s part, and that one’s brain may 
                                                        
7 Or at least, enough of these things that my verbal interactions will reliably pass for those 
of a human speaker. 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understand without conscious understanding on the part of the person in question. I 
believe that the operator who has memorized the program is not only unconscious of the 
understanding, but that it does not exist in their mind, proper. Unlike Boden, I believe that 
this counterargument has deeper implications for Searle’s reply than merely the 
possibility that a the operator could understand without being aware of it. 
Insightful as it is, Boden’s conclusion is hard to buy. It goes very much against 
human intuition to accept that two minds could share a brain, and more so that one could 
be nested in the other, as the Chinese‐understanding mind would be in the English 
understanding mind (through which, after all, all inputs and outputs must pass). There 
seem to be cases in modern neuropsychology that provide evidence against this intuition: 
cases such as patients whose brain hemispheres have been separated by the severing of 
the corpus callosum8, though this view remains controversial in neuroscience (see for 
instance: Sergent, 1987). 
I, however, am perfectly happy to grant that it is implausible that two minds could 
share a human brain. The notion that two minds frequently or ever exist in the same brain 
is not necessary to my reply. If we find it unbelievable that two entire human personae 
could exist in the same brain, then this is simply a testament to the fact that no human 
could ever conceivably commit to memory a system as complex as the one in the Chinese 
Room case. Recall how implausible it is that a human could even memorize the circuit and 
operations of a simple pocket calculator, when the operations of a human brain must be 
many orders of magnitude more complex.  
                                                        
8 See for instance How to Count People (Bajakian, 2010 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Searle acknowledges that human minds are produced by the structure and nature 
of the brain. It therefore follows that a given brain structure is sufficient for a mind to 
exist. It doesn’t seem that simply adding another identical brain structure in the same 
skull alongside the first is really problematic. Even Searle would have to agree that if some 
structure x is a human mind, then a single brain that happens to contain 2x is not 
impossible in principle. However, in practice, it runs up against our intuitions. We are 
inclined to think of two complete minds sharing one brain as an impossibility, because we 
never (or rarely) encounter this sort of phenomenon in daily life, and we tend not to think 
of a single brain as the right sort of thing to contain more than one mind.  
My true reply to Searle’s memorization counterexample is not, in fact, that we 
should grant that Searle’s memorizer has created a virtual mind when he commits the 
rulebook to memory. Rather, we should refuse to allow that a normal person could 
memorize it. Anyone with enough mental capacity to perfectly memorize and execute this 
mammoth program is sufficiently different from a normal human that it would then 
become reasonable to suppose they have two minds sharing a brain. What we understand 
to be a human brain has limited capacity for memorization. Searle’s program exceeds this 
capacity by a great deal, and in a significant way: it contains the means to effectively 
emulate a human’s responses. Therefore, the notion that the systems reply is defeated 
when our man or woman commits to memory the instructions ought to raise a red flag, for 
strange things are possible when a human mind has this sort of capacity.  
The resulting human would be very different in practice from what we think of as a 
human, a being who could memorize an entire human lifetime’s worth of information, 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behaviour and all9. It seems that we must either grant that a virtual mind would exist that 
could in principle “understand” Chinese, or that describing a human as memorizing this 
information is an attempt to sneak in a contentious assumption. This latter option is my 
response. Such a capacity so far exceeds what is meant by the word “human” that it leads 
to a disanalogy. In other words, Searle’s counterargument runs into a fork; either he 
grants that the “human” who memorizes the instructions has the brain capacity to 
completely duplicate the program, in which case their brain is the sort that can plausibly 
host two minds at once: or the operator cannot commit it to memory, in which case the 
systems reply advocate need not explain why the operator does not understand Chinese 
after memorizing. In either case, there is always a mind other than the operator’s that can 
be said to be understanding Chinese.  
  Thus, the systems reply is not defeated by the counterexample in which the 
operator memorizes the entire rulebook, because there is always a place where a mind 
capable of understanding can exist.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Or, if not a direct memorization of the behaviour and information, then the memorization 
of the mental structures necessary to generate the behaviour and information that we 
associate with a human mind. 
 
 
20 
2  Syntax and Semantics 
 
 
Searle’s first attack on the systems reply is his memorization counterexample. 
Having dealt with that in the previous chapter, there now remains his second, indirect 
attack on the systems reply: the impossibility of any syntactic program producing 
semantic meaning. 
 
2.1  Blood From A Stone: Is it Possible to Draw Semantic Meaning Syntactic 
Interactions? 
 
Even if one accepts the tricky notion of a virtual mind required by the systems 
reply advocate, there remains a further problem. One of Searle’s central arguments against 
Strong AI is that any program is necessarily composed of a control unit reading a symbol 
or input, moving on to another symbol determined by the previous one, and producing 
outputs of a given type. In the Chinese room, the operator has no idea which Chinese 
characters mean what – or even that they are linguistic characters at all. All that the 
operator knows is that arbitrary symbol #1 is followed by arbitrary symbol #2, and so on. 
There exists, therefore, a syntax of how to manipulate the symbols, but no semantic 
content except that given to the inputs and outputs by the programmer and the people 
outside the room. 
Searle puts it thus: 
“[…] ‘Could something think, understand, and so on solely in virtue of being a 
computer with the right sort of program? Could instantiating a program, the right 
program of course, by itself be a sufficient condition of understanding?’ 
 This I think is the right question to ask, […] and the answer is no.’ 
‘Why not?’ 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‘Because the formal symbol manipulations by themselves don’t have any 
intentionality; they are quite meaningless; they aren’t even symbol manipulations, 
since the symbols don’t symbolize anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have 
only a syntax but no semantics. Such intentionality as computers appear to have is 
solely in the minds of those who program them and those who use them.’ ” 
(Searle, 1980, p. 422, original emphasis) 
 
 Searle argues that no matter what properties the syntax of a given language are, it 
can never thereby acquire any semantic content – and therefore because its most basic 
elements have only syntactic and not semantic content, that no computer program can 
have semantic content.10  
However, Searle admits that humans are capable of understanding, and therefore 
that their thoughts or words can possess semantic content as well as syntactic. The human 
brain, however, is composed of parts that have no semantic significance. In the dialogue 
which serves as a conclusion to “Minds, Brains and Programs” Searle readily admits that a 
human brain can be accurately described as a machine instantiating one or more 
programs: 
 "Could a machine think?"  
The answer is, obviously, yes. We are precisely such machines. 
[…]"OK, but could a digital computer think?"  
If by "digital computer" we mean anything at all that has a level of description 
where it can correctly be described as the instantiation of a computer program, 
then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any 
number of computer programs, and we can think. (Searle, 1980, p. 424).  
 
The smallest meaningful units of the human brain – nerve axons, neurons, gap 
junctions – are merely physical objects with certain rules of interaction. From these 
                                                        
10 Although naturally the output of any program can be interpreted by a human and 
thereby (trivially) acquire semantic content. This happens, for instance, when a human 
reads the series of characters output by Schank’s story‐interpreting program. 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patently meaningless components, however, the human brain obviously manages to 
derive the ability to assign semantic meaning to statements and have a mind and 
intentional states. It therefore follows that merely being made up of elements that 
have no inherent meaning does not preclude the system as a whole from having 
meaning, since we know that humans do this.  
A possible reply to this objection is that I am misusing the terms “syntax” and 
“semantics” which can only properly be applied to purely linguistic systems. I grant this 
objection, with the caveat that if the meaning I assign above is incorrect then Searle’s must 
also be incorrect in the same way. In the Chinese room, the room and operator form a 
system in which a control unit – for instance, the operator ‐ is made such that it necessarily 
effects the proper changes or operations when given a set of inputs. Insofar as the control 
is simply an entity that necessarily causes certain events according to certain rules from 
certain initial conditions, it is analogous to the case of the physical components in a human 
brain effecting certain operations according to certain rules. Thus, if the physical structure 
of a human brain cannot be described as following a syntax, then neither can the operator 
in the Chinese room. Both are systems such that certain rules are followed given certain 
inputs. The rules to be followed are equally devoid of semantic content in both cases: 
physical laws in the case of the brain, symbol manipulation instructions in the case of the 
Chinese room. 
The reply has been made to my argument that the terms “syntax” and “semantics” 
clearly apply in the case of the Chinese room but not in the case of a brain, for the simple 
reason that the Chinese room consists of actual linguistic symbols being manipulated 
while a brain does not. To this I reply that Searle is not limiting his application of his 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argument to mere linguistic programs; in the case of the ambulatory robot (Searle, 1980. 
p. 420), Searle argues that information input to the robot through its visual receptors 
could be expressed as symbols to be modified by the interpreter, and the output used as 
control signals for arms and legs. In these cases, the visual‐sense input and motor‐control 
output, the inputs and outputs are clearly only “linguistic” in the most abstract sense: they 
can in principle be represented as symbols on a piece of paper. Searle clearly thinks that 
the syntax/semantics rebuttal applies even when the program in question is not applied 
directly to a linguistic problem. If we consider even visual information and movement to 
be things reducible to characters to be syntactically manipulated, then it seems like 
humans must, in fact, be subject to the same criticism as Searle’s robot in that we receive 
input from our senses and produce output through our behaviour through some physical 
operation of our internal components  ‐ where, then, does semantic content come in? 
In other words, we need not think of the operation of the control unit of a computer 
as purely a symbol manipulator – it is equally correct to think of it simply as a physical 
object following natural laws, just as is the human brain. Since the human mind consists of 
matter in a specific configuration, it follows that it is in principle possible for a 
computational device made of matter to be a mind, provided the correct program.  
As an anonymous hacker once put it: “What people forget is that there is no 
software. There are only different hardware states.” Any computer program has existence 
not only as lines of code in a compiler, but as specific states and patterns of a physical 
object (a computer). Because of this, it is perfectly legitimate to expect a program’s syntax 
to be able to produce semantics in the same way that the human brain does, because in 
either case, it is a matter of the right physical state obtaining. 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Searle believes that we should accept this intuitive assumption: no combination of 
semantically meaningless objects or symbol manipulations can produce meaning by virtue 
of their being sufficiently complex or organized.  However, we have uncovered three 
points that run counter to this assumption: 
1. Humans are capable of having thoughts with semantic content. 
2. Human thoughts are caused entirely by the human brain and its inputs. 
3. The human brain is composed entirely of components that, taken 
individually, have no semantic content at all.  
 
Our earlier intuition is incompatible with these three points. Therefore either our 
intuition is wrong, or some combination of these three assumptions is wrong. I will now 
defend the view that these points are correct, and that it is our assumption that semantic 
meaning cannot arise from syntax that is mistaken. 
I find it much more plausible that our intuition is incorrect than to overthrow any 
of the three premises. I freely admit that it is a considerable mystery how a mind, 
intentions, and understanding could somehow be produced when simple physical objects 
(axons, neurons, etc.) interact in the appropriate way. The mysterious nature of the 
human mind and brain is a well‐known puzzle for philosophers and scientists, and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. What is quite clear, however, is that humans do have the 
ability to create semantic content, and also that the smallest meaningful parts of the 
human brain (whatever those might be) do not contain semantic content. Searle seems to 
have no objection at all to premises 1 and 2. He might even agree to premise 3, but then 
add that the human brain is capable of semantic content not in virtue of its components 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being sufficiently complex or organized, but in virtue of their being made of the right sort 
of material. With regard to Searle’s advocacy of the biological brain as the seat of true 
understanding, I offer my reply in sections 2.2 and 2.2.1. 
Searle might object to my third premise – that the human brain is made of 
components which, taken individually, do not possess semantic meaning. The first half of 
this premise ‐ that the smallest relevant parts of the brain do not possess semantic content 
‐ is, I think, uncontroversial. However one subdivides the brain into component parts and 
processes, these will always be physical objects that can, in principle, be understood 
mechanistically. What might raise objections is the notion that we can describe the 
interactions of brain cells as “syntax”. In the introduction to chapter 2, I outlined why we 
ought to think of the physical structure of the brain as equivalent to an operator executing 
a program. I will now defend that assumption in greater detail in order to support my 
contention that Searle is incorrect in claiming that syntax cannot give rise to semantics. 
 
2.1.2 Brains and Symbols 
 
Let me begin my discussion of the brain by acknowledging the immense complexity 
of the human brain, and also the nascent state of our brain science. When I speak of 
looking at the “smallest relevant parts” of the human brain, it is controversial what these 
parts might be. Does human thought originate from the frequency and amplitude of waves 
of electrical impulses in the brain? From chemical balance in different parts of the brain? 
From the total system of firings of neurons? All of the above? Perhaps none of the above? 
Which features, if any, of the waves or chemical balances are important to thought, and 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which are merely accidental by‐products that could be abstracted away if one wanted to 
build a human thought simulator?  
These questions are sufficiently contentious (and beyond the scope of this paper) 
that no firm answer can be given here. Nor does one need to be. All that is required for my 
argument is the assumption that there is some physical threshold below which parts of 
the brain do not possess understanding. Some components of the brain are too small or 
specialized to be said to have or be a mind – for instance, a single neuron or axon or other 
small brain component. Whatever units one chooses as the smallest, they will be physical 
objects or states. This, I think, will be granted by anyone who believes that human thought 
is directly caused by, or identical to, physical states of the brain.  
Whether the smallest “important” parts of the brain are axons and gap junctions, or 
some yet‐unnamed subdivision of these, is unimportant. It is clear that these parts exist; 
that these parts taken as a system are the cause of human thought; and that these parts do 
not, taken individually, possess any sort of semantic content. Each of these objects is one 
such that when it receives certain inputs (electrical firings, chemicals such as 
neurotransmitters or neuroinhibitors, etc.), then it produces certain effects, such as 
transmitting electrical impulses through certain output channels, increasing or decreasing 
the concentration of certain chemicals, etc. At their basic level, these components of the 
brain can be understood mechanistically, or at least in terms of a cause‐and‐effect 
relationship between possible inputs and outputs. From these physical components, 
semantic content can arise. Indeed, all human thought somehow arises from interactions 
of those components. Therefore, we have established that it is possible for thought, minds, 
understanding, and so forth, to arise from non‐meaningful components if those 
 
 
27 
components are arranged in a certain way. Can we use this conclusion to defend the 
systems reply? How does Searle incorporate this fact into his own conclusions?  
Searle argues that “what matters about brain operations is not the formal shadow 
cast by the sequence of synapses but rather the actual properties of the sequences.” 
(Searle, 1980, p. 422) His motivation for assuming that non‐brain systems do not 
understand seems to be the Chinese room example itself. I reject his conclusion because 
the Chinese room itself does not demonstrate that the machine or total system does not 
understand, for the reasons given earlier. Is there any other reason to believe that the 
brain may be special as compared to the hardware of a digital computer? 
  First, we need to compare a mind made of brain components11 to a mind made 
from a symbol‐processing engine. Are there relevant differences? When I discuss the 
argument laid out in my syllogism, a common argument arises against it: there is a 
fundamental difference between a brain whose components are physical objects, and a 
program whose components are abstract symbols. The former is defined in terms of both 
hardware and software (even if both are identical or inseparable), whereas the latter is 
independent of its instantiation method and exists primarily as abstract symbols rather 
than physical objects.  
As mentioned earlier, it is a common misconception about computation that a 
computer program exists as a pure abstract string of symbols. Certainly it can be 
represented as such, and might even exist only in this state. For example, a program that is 
written on a napkin by a bored programmer, and never run on any system. But when a 
program is being instantiated by a computer, its nature is very different. In Turing’s 
                                                        
11 Individual cells, synapses, or any other physical unit(s) of the brain. 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Computing Machinery and Intelligence, a digital computer (or Turing machine) is described 
as consisting of a store (memory), executive unit, and control (Turing, 1950, p. 437). The 
symbols on the tape, when read, correspond to physical changes which take place in the 
computer. The control is built such that these actions necessarily happen. This is an 
important point of Turing’s definition, and one which still holds true of computer systems. 
The system is built such that the instructions of the program will happen through pure 
mechanical action. In other words, there exists a physical reality, when a program is 
operating, such that every command in the program necessarily leads to a certain physical 
state from which only one sequence of motions can occur. This means that if you write a 
program such that it produces the same outputs as a given person (or mind) would do, 
then there is a physical system (the computer) that is mirroring every physical process 
necessary to produce those outputs.  I emphasize the word “necessary” because I wish to 
be clear that the program’s computer might go about producing its results in a way that is 
mechanically quite different from what a human brain might do – however, the most basic 
structure of the computation will be present by definition, since the correct results can be 
produced. The abstract/physical distinction does not hold; any program being run 
necessarily involves some sort of physical structure that is capable of correctly executing 
it. Surely this applies even when the program is being executed on an unusual platform; 
even a program being run inside of a human mind, or a series of water pipes, or even a 
nation’s telephone grid, must produce a physical structure capable of realizing its effects. 
This is assuming, of course, that the hardware is such that it makes few errors and 
faithfully implements the program. This condition may affect our intuitions about 
programs run in human brains or with humans as elements of the program, since we do 
 
 
29 
not generally think of humans in the mechanistic way in which we think about computer 
processors.  
Recall the earlier observation: “What people forget is that there is no software. 
There are only different hardware states.” Because it is obvious that the appropriate 
program does not produce any understanding or mental states whatsoever if it is not 
implemented, I intend only to defend the possibility of understanding being granted to 
programs being implemented on hardware of some sort. There is no argument that a 
brilliant program simply written on a piece of paper or sitting in a text file is inactive and 
generating neither understanding nor mental states. In this condition, the program indeed 
has no existence beyond being a series of symbols that can have power only when 
interpreted by a being whose thoughts have semantic content – such as a human 
programmer. On the other hand, the moment such a program is “run” on a system whose 
specifications are sufficient to correctly perform it, the processes and activities outlined in 
the program gain physical reality. A program that produces a list of prime numbers must 
have the physical capacity to store and represent prime numbers in some form, and the 
capacity to calculate further ones. There must exist some concrete system which can be 
thought of as the “brain” of a program. This is by definition true even of exotic computers 
(the water pipes, punch cards, etc.) – being capable of running the program means being 
able to represent all necessary elements, among other things. 
  We have established that a program being instantiated on a computer is not purely 
symbolic in nature; it must correspond to an appropriate physical system. The program 
determines the movements and changes that this system undergoes. Therefore, it does not 
seem apt to say that a computer program has only symbolic meaning, whereas human 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mind has semantic meaning, if what is meant is that the computer program exists only in 
the form of abstract symbols and the brain does not.  
The physical brain and the physical computer hardware have no important 
differences in this regard: both systems are based on a physical object which, through 
basic physical laws, effects the operations necessary for the correct outputs. 
Steven Savitt (1982) makes a similar argument about the significance of a brain‐
simulating program. His argument begins by supposing that a human brain is composed of 
n neurons. If we remove one neuron and replace it with its simulation, it seems obvious 
that understanding does not therefore disappear. Call this state (one replaced neuron) n – 
1. Continue the process until n = 0 and you have the Chinese Room. Every neuron is 
replaced with its simulation in a large program. At what point does understanding 
disappear?  Since there is no obvious point at which understanding can be clearly seen to 
vanish, why not grant that it is present even in this final state?  
Unfortunately the impossibility of defining a specific line where the qualitative 
change happens does not prove that both extremes are equivalent. Savitt argues, as I do, 
that the distinction between the actual brain and the faithful simulation is unimportant. At 
the very least, this case illustrates how the distinction between simulation and genuine 
article can be reduced to a graded scale rather than an absolute division. This provides the 
basis for a sufficiently thorough simulation to be considered as good as the so‐called real 
thing. 
  There is another possible meaning to the syntax/semantics objection. The 
argument exists that a computer program may possess syntax and a physical reality, but 
that programs cannot contain semantic content (or that it remains to be demonstrated 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that they can). In response to this point I simply repeat my earlier argument: the human 
brain is capable of producing semantic content, the human brain is a physical object 
moving according to certain laws whose component parts have no semantic content, 
therefore it is possible for semantic content to arise from a physical object ordered in the 
proper way. Certainly it is not the case that all programs have semantic content ‐ clearly 
there are certain minimum requirements for such content to be produced by a physical 
system – but we have established here that it is not, as Searle claims, impossible to obtain a 
semantically meaningful system from a syntactic one. Since computer programming 
syntax consists of a series of symbols which lead to certain physical states in a computer, 
then when discussing the possibility of obtaining semantic meaning from syntax with a 
computer program, we must allow that the definition of “syntax” can be taken to include a 
series of commands which cause physical objects to move in a certain way (the sense used 
when discussing computer programs). 
  The argument I wish to defend as to why we ought to grant the capacity of 
understanding to certain programmed computers is derived from the two points 
established above: first, that the human brain is capable of thinking, understanding, and 
attributing meaning (semantics), even though the human brain is no more than a very 
complex physical object, and second, that any software being executed on a computing 
system necessarily entails a certain structure in hardware – that is, physical objects. This 
hardware could be any computing device of sufficient power and capacity for the program 
in question: anything from a modern personal computer to a human brain to a series of 
water pipes and valves, properly configured. 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If we accept these two premises, then we cannot rule out the possibility of a 
program capable of understanding simply on the basis that it is a program. The mere fact 
that the program’s “smallest parts” are simply objects following rules is not a 
disqualification from its possessing understanding, as shown through the case of the 
human brain. What criteria should we then use when we are deciding whether or not to 
attribute understanding to a given subject? 
 
2.2  In Defense of Behaviourism 
 
I believe, contra Searle, that the answer is: observe their behaviour. Given the 
premise that both human brains and computers are physical objects, I will show that we 
ought to base our decision whether to attribute “understanding” to a given subject based 
on its observed behaviour. Thus, any computer system that can satisfactorily emulate 
some capacity of the mind has that capacity ‐ understanding or otherwise. It is worth 
noting that it may make a very big difference which capacities are being claimed of a given 
program and which are not, as I discuss later in my section on concessions to Searle. In 
order to steer clear of certain issues that arise when discussing computers mimicking only 
a narrow aspect of a human mind (such as the ability to understand stories, or play chess, 
but nothing else) I will employ my own thought experiment for this section. Later in this 
thesis, in the section “Concessions to Searle”, I will examine in greater detail why we ought 
to be cautious about granting such properties as “understanding” to a program that 
produces only a narrow range of behaviour types, such as an accounting program, a 
simple linguistic translation program, or even a story‐comprehension program. Suppose 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that we had a human‐imitating program of a quality utterly unheard of as of this writing, a 
program that duplicated every human capability which can be experienced through the 
medium of a modern personal computer. This program is therefore able to communicate 
through textual and voice chat, and perhaps even create a video image of itself speaking. 
This program, we suppose, has no trouble at all with the Turing test in any form. It 
flawlessly demonstrates the ability to handle complicated or inter‐referential sentences, 
remembers details, takes initiative, occupies itself when not being directly interacted with 
by a human, appreciates and even produces written stories, articles, poetry, songs and 
other such creative media, is able to “get” humour and sarcasm as least as well as the 
average human, etc. In short, this computer program duplicates every “output” of an 
ordinary human except of course the possession of an organic brain and body. Let us call 
this program Alicia for ease of reading. Should we believe that Alicia has a mind, is capable 
of thought or understanding? After all, it is not uncommon in today’s world to have 
acquaintances one has never met or interacted with except through the media of text, 
voice and video correspondence. Presumably we grant these acquaintances understanding 
even though we have not experienced firsthand their possession of a biological body. 
Therefore, having known and interacted with Alicia for many years, should we attribute to 
her the power to understand? 
Searle has a reply to a similar question (the robot reply), in which he answers that 
of course we should grant Alicia, or any convincing human‐imitator, the status of 
understanding as well as any other mental properties we ordinarily grant to other humans 
– so long as we do not know that she is a fake. The instant that we know that her mind is 
not derived from a flesh and blood brain, we should no longer consider her to be a person, 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nor possessed of a mind, nor able to understand. (Searle, 1980. p. 420) The reason, he 
implies, that we assume that all things which look or behave like humans possess minds 
and thoughts is one of convenience – and an application of Occam’s Razor. One could be a 
skeptic about minds other than one’s own, but this is impractical, philosophically 
unattractive and rude. Rather, we take the stance that anything that passes for human is a 
human more or less like ourselves – therefore possessed of a mind. This assumption is a 
very safe one because, in the past, the risk of encountering something that was not a 
human but was able to pass for a human even for a brief time was extremely rare. 
Chatterbot programs such as ELIZA or ALICE did not exist. There was no conceivable way 
that a being that was talking to you for more than a few words would not be a human. The 
best candidates for passing the Turing Test prior to the 20th century would probably have 
been a few unusually talented parrots. But this assumption is based on a premise which is 
no longer entirely true; things that can pass for human, at least for a time and under the 
right conditions, do exist, and become more common every day. We should therefore be 
more cautious in our attribution of such properties as having a mind, and be quicker to 
withdraw them when we have reason for suspicion. Therefore a program’s mere ability to 
pass for human is insufficient to demonstrate that it possesses understanding. We grant 
understanding only to humans, and the moment evidence arises that Alicia is not a bona 
fide human, we withdraw our assumption that she has a mind, whatever other properties 
she may have. 
What is wrong with this position? In order to attack this argument, we need to 
examine what exactly it is about humans that we think distinguishes them from Alicia. We 
grant minds to other humans as a matter of convenience. Is this based entirely on our 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belief that they are human and not on their behaviour? I intend to show that our tendency 
to grant that other beings have minds is based largely on their behaviour and not merely 
our belief that they are biologically human. – therefore demonstrating that this tendency 
is not leading us astray when we apply it to Alicia and the like. 
Consider the case of a human who is dead, or brain‐dead. This is a being 
indistinguishable in form, mass, and basic structure from a human. In purely physical 
terms, a corpse or a brain‐dead human is infinitely more similar to a living human than is 
a computer to a living human – and yet we would be foolish to say that a dead human, or a 
human with sufficiently extreme brain damage, has a mind. Why would we assume that 
the humans in these cases do not have minds? The first reason is that we intuit that a mind 
requires some sort of thinking thing – a working brain. Neither case has a working brain. 
But more primitively, we deny them a mind because we are not convinced by their 
behaviour. In both cases the human fails to display intelligent or intentional behaviour. 
This is one case in which a human with a brain is not granted the status of mind based 
purely on their being human, but also based on their behaviour.  
Now consider the case of a person with a severe mental illness, who appears not to 
recognize or remember other people, whose plans are irrational or inconsistent, who is 
unable to communicate meaningfully, form or execute plans, etc. despite their body, other 
than their brain, being sound. There are surely some cases of this nature in which a 
reasonable observer would refrain from granting understanding and perhaps even the 
possession of a mind, in the most extreme cases (complete persistent vegetative state with 
no visible brain activity beyond the minimum required for life signs, for instance). Again, it 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seems that observed behaviour is an important factor in whether or not our intuition to 
grant “mind” to an entity applies.  
Thus, our intuition to grant minds and understanding to other beings is not entirely 
motivated by our belief that the beings in question are humans. It seems that behaviour is 
a factor as well. Searle would probably be happy to grant this; it does not weaken his 
position, because he need only stipulate the caveat that both being human and 
demonstrating intelligent behaviour are necessary conditions, and that what is sufficient 
for understanding is that both are present. This still rules out any computer program run 
on a non‐human computer, however sophisticated its behaviour. All of this labour to show 
that both conditions apply, however, is not in vain. We now ask, “Why is being biologically 
human a relevant feature?” I will answer this question in Chapter 3, in which I establish 
ability to pass a revised Turing test, rather than biological status, as the proper criteria for 
detecting the ability to understand. 
 
2.2.1  The Martian Problem 
 
In Minds, Brains and Programs, Searle briefly addresses the possibility that humans 
could encounter beings who possess intentionality but whose brains are biologically very 
different from human ones, in this passage: 
“It is not because I am the instantiation of a computer program that I am able 
to understand English and have other forms of intentionality (I am, I suppose, 
the instantiation of any number of computer programs), but as far as we 
know it is because I am a certain sort of organism with a certain biological (i.e. 
chemical and physical) structure, and this structure, under certain conditions, 
is causally capable of producing perception, action, understanding, learning, 
and other intentional phenomena. And part of the point of the present 
argument is that only something that had those causal powers could have that 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intentionality. Perhaps other physical and chemical processes could produce 
exactly these effects; perhaps, for example, Martians also have intentionality 
but their brains are made of different stuff. That is an empirical question, 
rather like the question whether photosynthesis can be done by something 
with a chemistry different from that of chlorophyll.” (Searle, 1980, p. 422, my 
emphasis) 
 
Here Searle seems to want to make it clear that he does not believe that human brain is 
the only possible way to achieve genuine intentionality – rather, he wishes to limit his 
conclusion to denying the possibility of a formal program being sufficient for 
understanding. The problem with his assertion is his statement that the Martians’ being 
capable of possessing intentionality is an empirical question.  
Searle grants that it is possible to exactly duplicate the outputs of an intentional 
being using methods that do not generate genuine understanding – hence, he argues that 
behavioural tests are insufficient as a test of understanding. Since he grants that the mere 
exhibition of apparently intentional behaviour is insufficient to detect the presence of real 
understanding, how could we determine if the Martians were in fact intentional beings 
and not a sort of zombie, no more intelligent than the Chinese room itself? 
Searle might be arguing that we need only test any Martians we encounter to see if 
their brain processes are purely formal programs. If they are, then presumably he would 
say we should not grant them intentionality, and treat them like convincing forgeries of 
intelligent life. It is not evident to me what sort of tests would determine as a certainty 
whether or not the Martian brain was, in fact, executing a formal symbol manipulating 
program in the same way that, say, a digital computer might.  
In other words, Searle’s position on what constitutes the proper sort of thing to 
have understanding or intention appears to make it impossible for him to ever establish 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whether or not he ought to treat a Martian as an intentional being. He cannot determine 
based on their behaviour whether or not they understand, since he already grants that in 
principle a program might exactly duplicate the outward behaviour of a human and not 
understand a thing. What further criteria could he apply when examining their brains to 
decide whether or not he would grant them understanding? If their brains were made of 
too strange a substance, or if the operations of these brains were too similar to those of a 
digital computer, how would Searle react? After all, Searle seems to have no objection to 
the notion that a being might act like an intelligent creature without possessing 
understanding. He therefore has no reason to suppose that the Martians do or do not 
possess genuine understanding, and cannot assume the position that they have intention 
by default. 
It is also interesting to consider this scenario: suppose that a Martian – or even, Mr. 
Spock of Star Trek – were to land on earth tomorrow and announce his goodwill toward 
humankind. After humans scan Spock’s brain, it is discovered that his brain processes can 
be described in terms of formal symbol manipulations, and that his brain much more 
closely resembles a digital computer than that of a human. Would Searle then decide that 
humans had no more obligation toward Spock and his race than we have toward a 
personal computer or a filing cabinet? The possibility that, somewhere, intelligent‐
seeming beings might have evolved brains that do not qualify as intentional by Searle’s 
standards is a case that shows that his intuitions about understanding may lead to some 
very confusing conclusions when applied to cases beyond humans and digital computers. 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3  The Necessity of the Turing Test 
 
 
  The Turing test as originally proposed by Turing is imperfect. There is a need for 
the somewhat speculative format of the test in Turing’s original paper to be modified. 
There are several reasons for this: philosopher Stevan Harnad puts forward a number of 
revisions to the test in his article Minds, Machines and Turing. I will outline Harnad’s basic 
objections to the standard “as‐written” Turing test insofar as they mirror my own 
position. Harnad makes a large concession to Searle when outlining his proposed test of 
machine understanding, however – a concession that I believe to be in error, and will 
rebut here as I outline my own version of the Turing test. 
 
3.1  Basic Objections to Turing 
 
 
Why should we care whether or not a given being is biologically human if its 
behaviour appears to be very human‐like? There are many possible reasons to believe that 
the ability to pass for human is not a reliable indicator. I consider the more common ones 
here. 
 The first is one that Turing considered in his original defence of the Turing Test ‐ 
the argument that humans are capable of emotions, feelings, understanding, mental states, 
pain, pleasure, love, being resourceful, taking initiative, being creative, etc. which, an 
opponent of the Turing Test might claim, are not necessarily going to be present even in a 
computer program that perfectly mimics human outputs. Alan Turing identified this brand 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of objection as “The Argument From Various Disabilities”12, and I will not consider it in 
great detail. Rather I will quote Turing’s reply: 
“No support is usually offered for these statements. I believe they are 
mostly founded on the principle of scientific induction. A man has seen 
thousands of machines in his lifetime. From what he sees of them he 
draws a number of general conclusions. They are ugly, each is designed 
for a very limited purpose, when required for a minutely different 
purpose they are useless, the variety of behaviour of any one of them is 
very small, etc., etc. Naturally he concludes that these are necessary 
properties of machines in general. […] A few years ago, when very little 
had been heard of digital computers, it was possible to elicit much 
incredulity concerning them, if one mentioned their properties without 
describing their construction.[…] The works and customs of mankind do 
not seem to be very suitable material to which to apply scientific 
induction. (Turing, 1950, p.335)  
In other words, many of the properties of intelligence, creativity, initiative, and so 
forth, which we today deny to computers, could be attributed to the fact that no 
computers or machines to date have displayed these properties. This, as I hope the history 
of computation has shown, is a very poor reason to believe it is impossible in principle for 
computers to display such properties.  It was once believed that computers would never 
be capable of playing Chess at the level of a human expert. Such beliefs about the 
limitations of computers have a way of embarrassing those who support them once ten or 
                                                        
12 Turing, 1950 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twenty years have passed. In the same way, the idea that a computer cannot think (which I 
estimate is fairly popular at the moment) may seem just as foolish in a few decades as the 
belief that a computer could never defeat a Kasparov or pilot an airplane, when perhaps 
the sight of a computer communicating at a near‐human level of apparent intelligence 
becomes more commonplace. As for those “deficiencies” of an emotional nature, such as 
the presumed inability of a computer to feel love, anger, sorrow or joy – or, for that matter, 
pain and pleasure –there are two avenues of response. First, we could argue, as Turing 
does, that these are frivolous requirements. There exist many humans who, allegedly, do 
not experience certain emotions (or in some cases, any emotions). We do not therefore 
claim that they do not possess minds or the general capacity for thought, mental states 
and understanding. Before such an objection can be raised, the case must be made that 
emotions are a necessary part of having a mind and not merely an accidental feature that 
does not directly contribute to the ability to understand. Second, even if one insists that 
emotions and the like are essential parts of mental life, I do not think that this need 
trouble a programmer overmuch. Of all of the elements of human experience, emotions 
are probably one of the most primitive and basic features; as evidenced by the fact that 
many nonhuman animals whose brains and behaviour appear much more simple than 
that of humans (consider cats, dogs, birds, etc.) seem to experience them. At minimum, all 
that is necessary to make any artificial person display emotions is to make their emotional 
state have the “correct” (plausible) effect on their behaviour. This means that designing a 
chatterbot to “feel” anger could be as simple as having an “anger” variable whose value 
effects the text outputs given. It is not necessary to wonder whether the robot can actually 
subjectively experience these emotions, so long as their behaviour is consistent with a 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human’s under similar circumstances –. In fact, the 1998 interactive fiction computer 
game Starship Titanic, written by Douglas Adams of Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Universe 
fame, boasted several chatterbot artificial intelligence characters that interacted textually 
with the player. These bots had several separate emotional dimensions which were 
influenced by the player’s inputs and also influenced the bot’s outputs to the player. 
Naturally these were constructs of a very rudimentary nature, but the essential point is 
that it is not difficult to imagine in principle how to duplicate the effects of emotion on 
behaviour when programming an artificial mind. Even subtle emotions such as 
amusement, love, hatred, etc. seem to possess nothing that might put them off‐limits of 
computer thought, however flattering it may be to us as humans to imagine that they are.  
Having dealt with the objection from various disabilities as to why being human 
ought to matter when determining the possession of a mind, we move on to Searle’s 
objection; that something about the brain matters. Searle’s arguments about programs 
and computers being fundamentally different than minds and brains are relevant here. In 
particular: 
“[…] the distinction between program and realization has the consequence that 
the same program could have all sorts of crazy realizations that had no form of 
intentionality. Weizenbaum (1976, Ch. 2), for example, shows in detail how to 
construct a computer using a roll of toilet paper and a pile of small stones. 
Similarly, the Chinese story understanding program can be programmed into a 
sequence of water pipes, a set of wind machines, or a monolingual English 
speaker, none of which thereby acquires an understanding of Chinese. Stones, 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toilet paper, wind, and water pipes are the wrong kind of stuff to have 
intentionality in the first place – only something that has the same causal powers 
as brains can have intentionality – and though the English speaker has the right 
kinds of stuff for intentionality you can easily see that he doesn’t get any extra 
intentionality by memorizing the program, since memorizing it won’t teach him 
Chinese.” (Searle, 1980, p. 423) 
This conclusion is, I think, at the heart of Searle’s position. I also think that it is 
based on false premises. First, the offhand claim that “toilet paper rolls, wind, pipes, etc.” 
are the wrong sort of thing is flawed in two very important ways which Searle neglects to 
mention. First, scale. Let’s discuss a program that is as good a candidate as any for the title 
of being a program that, when instantiated, creates a mind: Alicia. Recall that Alicia can 
display an incredible range of human abilities, including convincing verbal communication 
over any scale of time, the ability to write songs, evaluate art, learn new skills and make 
acquaintances, etc. All of these tasks require immense computational power. The program 
required merely for the Chinese room (which would be much easier, I presume, than an 
Alicia program), in order to produce a convincing answer for literally any Chinese 
question, would have to be extremely complex and, given the necessary operations, 
probably on a greater order of complexity than the any existing computer program. Now, 
keeping in mind this staggering complexity, imagine that you were required to build a 
computer out of toilet paper rolls and stones, and then cause it to execute a program such 
as Microsoft Word or even the scientific calculator program found on some PCs. The 
contraption it would be necessary to build – the amount of stones and time and the scale 
involved – would result in either a device the size of a house, or a running time of the age 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of the universe, or any other absurdly large figure you care to name. Now scale it up to a 
program for all human behaviour like Alicia, or even just the Chinese room. We are not 
dealing with a simple cardboard tube with some pebbles in it – we are dealing with a 
network of pipes, valves, and pumps the size of a solar system. By definition such a 
construct would also be able to carry on a conversation and display a wide range of 
human traits such as memory, outward emotion, etc. Searle appeals to our intuitions that 
these “novelty” implementations are simply absurd little inanimate objects that clearly 
cannot contain intention – but recall that the programs they are being required to 
instantiate are of staggering complexity  ‐ and, more important, that you can talk to them. 
Again, the solar‐system‐sized maze of pipes and water that is instantiating Alicia could, by 
definition, carry on a conversation (provided you know how to convert its outputs to 
human language and vice versa). When dealing with an entity such as this, we should 
definitely be extremely cautious of our intuitions before making sweeping statements 
such as that they obviously have no form of intentionality. This is especially true when the 
only plausible way to make sense of an Alicia program, even running on water pipes, 
would be to take the intentional stance13 with it, due to its complexity. Searle’s 
(unjustified) statement that these objects are simply the wrong sort of thing is begging the 
question; it is an axiom of the systems reply that any physical system could, in principle, 
host a mind. Searle, I daresay, is hoping that the reader will conjure to mind a pitiful toilet‐
paper roll with some stones in it, or the image of a few gears turned by wind‐powered 
fans. These simple constructs are indeed as incapable of understanding, thinking, or 
                                                        
13 That is to say, we would predict the behaviour of the object by assigning intentions and 
goals to it, in the same way as we attempt to predict the behaviour of other humans. To 
predict the responses of the complex pipe system using brute physics would likely be as 
useless as it would be with a human brain. 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having a mind as are a cluster of three or four brain cells, since in order to run even a 
simple program they would require time on the order of years – for a program like Alicia, 
they would require the lifetime of the universe to produce two or three sentences worth of 
computation (again, this is almost surely an underestimate). Analogously, we do not 
conclude from the fact that a small number of brain cells do not seem to be capable of 
understanding that a complete human brain is likewise incapable; why should we have a 
double standard when considering media such as circuit boards (or even water pipes)? 
Therefore Searle’s claim that certain non‐brain objects cannot understand requires 
more support than he offers.  
 
3.2  Harnad’s Objections 
 
  Stevan Harnad examines what criteria should be used for a more conclusive Turing 
test. I agree with his basic outline of the test, and will include his thoughts on that subject. 
However, Harnad also makes what I believe to be a crucial error in defining his test.  
  Harnad identifies five levels of detail for Turing tests: 
 “Turing’s celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very general methodological criterion 
for modeling mental function: total functional equivalence and indistinguishability. 
His criterion gives rise to a hierarchy of Turing Tests, from subtotal (“toy”) 
fragments of our functions (t1), to total symbolic (pen‐pal) function (T2 – the 
standard Turing Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), to 
total internal microfunction (T4), to total indistinguishability in every empirically 
discernible respect (T5). This is a “reverse‐engineering” hierarchy of (decreasing) 
empirical underdetermination of the theory by the data.” (Harnad, 2000, p. 1) 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 Harnad believes that T1, the “toy” level, is plainly too lenient a test of 
understanding and possession of a mind. In section 4.3, I examine in greater depth the 
idea that programs that emulate only some small part of human ability ought not to be 
said to understand – even if the understanding that we attribute them were to be limited 
to their particular specialties (for instance, we should be wary of granting that a chess 
program “understands” chess merely because it can produce strong chess moves). 
  Harnad also rejects the T2 model: the “pen‐pal,” with whom we exchange symbols 
to communicate. He says that the T2 model is satisfactory enough, except that it can be 
revealed as a fraud when we subject it to what he calls the “Searlean Test”: if you were to 
read and execute the program that passes the T2 test, you would not yourself have any 
understanding of the supposed “mind” being produced. Indeed, the fact that a person 
executing the code does not gain any understanding of the program’s mind is, on Harnad’s 
view, the death stroke for the T2 test. When he considers the position of the systems reply 
– that the code might produce a “mind” even if the person running the program by hand is 
not aware of it – he replies thus: 
 “This is spooky stuff. We know about multiple personality disorder – extra minds 
cohabiting the same head, not aware of one another – but that is normally induced 
by early sexual abuse rather than by learning to manipulate mindlessly a bunch of 
meaningless symbols. So I think it makes more sense to give up on cognitive 
computationalism and concede that either no implemented code alone could ever 
successfully pass the lifetime T2, or that any code that did so would nevertheless 
fail to have a mind; that it would indeed be just a trick. And the way to test this 
would be via the “Searlean Test” (ST), by being the candidate, executing the code 
oneself, and failing to experience the mental state (understanding) that is being 
attributed to the pen‐pal. As one has no intuitive inclination whatsoever to impute 
extra mental states to oneself in the face of clear 1st‐person evidence that one lacks 
them, the ST should, by the transitivity of implementation‐independence, rule out 
all purely computational T2‐passers. A purely computational T2‐passer, in other 
words, is Turing distinguishable from a candidate with a mind, and the way to 
make the distinction is to be the candidate, via the ST.” (Harnad, 2000, pp. 13‐14) 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 I think this is a curious conclusion to adopt. What would a program look like, I 
wonder, that did impart new understanding on the person executing it? If such a program 
were written, would Harnad grant that it possesses a mind even when being executed by a 
system of water pipes that formed a makeshift computer? Presumably, a program that 
imparted understanding of its operations to a person who was implementing the code in 
the style of the operator in the Chinese room would simply be a program with a great deal 
of “commenting” – messages to the reader interspersed in the code, explaining what each 
operation does. For instance, “transpose symbol X to position Y” might become something 
like “We have now determined that symbol X is the name of the interrogator, who has 
asked us our name. We will transpose symbol X into our response such that we may reply 
in the form ‘nice to meet you, X’.  Therefore, transpose symbol X to position Y. “ It is 
certainly not obvious that the presence of these notes to the reader, which need have no 
actual effect on the outcome of the program when run on a conventional computer, would 
add any greater plausibility to the notion of a given program being sufficient to generate 
understanding or not. 
  There is a further objection which is even more problematic to Harnad’s premise 
that a program can be disqualified from possessing understanding for failing to impart 
understanding to its operator in the Chinese room. Namely, since Searle is happy enough 
to admit that the human brain can be conceived of as a machine instantiating a program 
(or programs), it seems doubtful in the extreme to me that this program, when executed in 
the Chinese room, would impart the least understanding to the operator. This objection is 
of no trouble for Searle himself, naturally, since he insists that the medium of 
implementation is all‐important, and that even the correct “program” of a human mind 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achieves understanding in virtue of the brain itself, not the mere fact of being executed. 
Harnad has no such stipulation. Since we grant that the human mind program produces 
understanding when it runs in a human brain, and it seems obvious that it would impart 
no understand whatever on a person implementing it in the Chinese room, it must be the 
case that the operator’s understanding anything when implementing a given program is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient test of whether the program in question can generate 
understanding simply by being implemented. Thus, I conclude, contra Harnad, that a 
program need not produce understanding in a human operator in a Chinese room 
scenario in order to be a potential candidate for the generation of genuine understanding.  
With this worry assuaged, we are able to focus solely on whether or not the program 
produces outputs which can pass for human on a long time frame with a convincing level 
of (apparent) intelligence, creativity, emotion, and other human characteristics. 
   
3.3  Against Turing: Blockheads and Understanding 
 
 
Ned Block has argued against the Turing Test as a standard for detecting  
intelligence. In his 1981 paper “Psychologism and Behaviourism” he sets forward a 
thought experiment meant to demonstrate that the Turing Test will “pass” entities which 
are self‐evidently not intelligent ones. Block’s arguments are relevant not only to my 
advocacy of the Turing Test, but also the functionalism and behaviourism I endorse in my 
reply to Searle. I shall therefore address Block’s argument and show that his proposed 
counter‐example does not in fact succeed in debunking the Turing Test as an adequate 
measure of intelligence or understanding. 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Block discusses what would constitute a fair and charitable definition of the criteria 
of the Turing Test and arrives at this:  “Intelligence (or more accurately, conversational 
intelligence) is the disposition to produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses to a 
sequence of verbal stimuli, whatever they may be.” (Block, 1981. p. 4). Block calls this 
amended version of the Turing Test thesis the “Neo‐Turing Test”. This definition is nearly 
acceptable for the purposes of this thesis, given that the use of “disposition” addresses 
counterfactual cases such as those I discuss in section 4.2.There is, however, one 
important detail that Block fails to note in his definition of intelligence as put forward by 
the Turing Test, and this is the fact that the test is to be carried out with a limited 
timeframe. Specifically, the machine attempting to pass the test must consistently answer 
quickly enough to pass for a human. This detail will become very important in my 
response to Block. 
Taking the Neo‐Turing Test as the criterion for intelligence, Block defines a 
machine that will pass the Turing Test while failing to be intelligent. The principle of the 
machine is to contain in advance a table of every possible sensible exchange of phrases in 
a dialogue. Here, “sensible” is taken in the broadest possible sense – it excludes only 
completely absurd statements. Given that there are a finite number of sensible English 
sentences in a given conversation between two speakers for a finite number of exchanges 
– for instance, suppose one thousand total phrases between both speakers – then all of 
these possible conversations are also finite in number. Thus, it is in principle possible for a 
team of clever programmers to create a branching “tree” of all possible conversations, 
matching each possible statement by the machine to another statement by the human 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judge, and then further possible responses, and so on.  Block gives this example of its 
functioning (using “string” interchangeably with “sentence”): 
“Imagine the set of sensible strings recorded on tape and deployed by a very simple 
machine as follows. The interrogator types in sentence A. The machine searches its 
list of sensible strings, picking out those that begin with A. It then picks one of these 
A‐initial strings at random, and types out its second sentence, call it ``B''. The 
interrogator types in sentence C. The machine searches its list, isolating the strings 
that start with A followed by B followed by C. It picks one of these ABC‐initial 
strings and types out its fourth sentence, and so on.” (Block, 1981, p. 10). 
Block’s program (also affectionately known as a “Blockhead”) is thus a lookup table. Every 
possible input is simply matched to a list of suitable outputs, from which one is selected at 
random. By definition, the responses produced by this program will be as convincing as 
those of the programmers themselves, or perhaps even more so, since they will be the 
result of the collaborative work of several authors. Therefore we must grant that this 
program will pass Block’s definition of the Turing Test. Simultaneously we must admit 
that no possible intelligence could exist in so simple a structure. Thus, the Turing Test is 
defeated. As Block puts it, 
“[…] the machine has the intelligence of a toaster. All the intelligence it exhibits is 
that of its programmers. Note also that its limitation to Turing Tests of an hour's 
length is not essential. For a Turing Test of any given length, the machine could in 
principle be programmed in just the same way to pass a Turing Test of that length.” 
(Block, 1981, p. 10, original emphasis) 
 
Block compares the functioning of such a program to a two‐way radio. If a two‐way 
radio were entered in a Turing Test, it would surely “pass,” provided that a human 
operator was providing the responses for the radio. Yet no‐one would grant that the radio 
 
 
51 
was therefore intelligent. “All of the intelligence here,” we would object, “is that of the 
human operator. This machine is just transmitting their responses to us.” Block then 
proposes that his program is just the same as the two‐way radio, except that the 
conversation has been stored in advance. It is nevertheless merely reproducing word‐for‐
word a response thought up by a human operator, and is therefore no more intelligent 
than is the radio. Block continues: 
“I conclude that the capacity to emit sensible responses is not sufficient for intelligence, and so the 
neo‐Turing Test conception of intelligence is refuted (along with the older and cruder Turing Test 
conceptions). I also conclude that whether behavior is intelligent behavior is in part a matter of how it is 
produced. Even if a system has the actual and potential behavior characteristic of an intelligent being, if its 
internal processes are like those of the machine described, it is not intelligent.” (Block, 1981, p. 11) 
 
If the capacity to emit sensible responses is insufficient for intelligence (or, we may 
infer, understanding), then naturally my position that a suitably thorough Turing Test is 
untenable. It therefore falls to me to answer: what is wrong with Block’s argument? 
Block lists a number of possible objections to his conclusions in his paper. My 
objection is the one he lists as #6:  
“Combinatorial explosion makes your machine impossible. George Miller long ago 
estimated (Miller et al., 1960) that there are on the order of 1030 grammatical 
sentences 20 words in length. Suppose (utterly arbitrarily) that of these 1015 are 
semantically well formed as well. An hour‐long Turing Test would require perhaps 100 
such sentences. That makes 101500 strings, a number which is greater than the number 
of particles in the universe.” (Block, 1981, p. 16) 
 
Block replies that he only claims his machine to be logically possible, not realizable in 
actuality. Since the Neo‐Turing Test is not meant to be a conceptual claim, rather than an 
empirical one, then the mere logical possibility of an unintelligent machine capable of passing 
the test is a sufficient refutation. (Block, 1981, p. 17) 
Block’s reply fails to adequately address the one crucial difference between the 
performance of his machine and the performance of an actual human when subjected to a 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Turing Test: response time. Given the astronomical size of the list of possible statements used 
by his program, it is certain that in practical terms it would be exceedingly slow in its 
responses if the hardware instantiating it were any sort of currently extant processor – slow 
enough that a one‐hour test would likely be insufficient for even a single response from it. This 
is obviously the sort of problem that would cause the program to fail an actual Turing Test, 
even though the responses it would eventually look up might be very convincing ones. In 
order to pass for human in an actual test (which, as I contend, is a crucial element of a reliable 
Turing Test), Block’s machine’s responses must be sped up. There are two main ways to 
accomplish this. I argue that no matter which of these two approaches one takes, speeding up 
the program enough to pass for human entails a qualitative change that makes it no longer 
obvious that the machine is unintelligent. For both of my responses I will assume that it is 
somehow possible to store all of Block’s machine’s possible statements on some sort of 
computer storage device, even though this is very unlikely given the numbers above. Instead I 
will concern myself only with the amount of time necessary to look up responses from this 
staggering list. 
The first way to speed up the response of the machine is to improve the quality of the 
program. This could be done by adding processes to analyze the incoming statement and 
rapidly narrow down the possible responses based on the type of statement that was input. 
For instance, having possible responses grouped into “answers to questions”, “responses to 
non‐interrogatives”, “questions”, etc.  Each of these categories could, itself, be further 
subdivided (responses to questions about myself, responses to questions about current 
events, etc.) to a great degree. In order to speed the process of sifting all possible statements 
to merely the list of suitable ones, it would be necessary to subdivide the statements very 
thoroughly, and to develop a sufficiently capable parser capable of analyzing an incoming 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statement and determining which categories of responses it ought to consider first. In the end 
we arrive at a program which not only contains all possible statements but also possesses a 
system to analyze incoming statements and sort through its own possible categories of stored 
statements. In order to pass a Turing Test this program must be so effective in its analysis and 
categorization (or whatever efficiency techniques its programmers can devise) that it can sort 
through 101500 sentences quickly enough to respond with human speed ‐ and that figure is 
merely for a one hour test. When the analysis and sorting system of the program reaches this 
level of sophistication, I propose that it is no longer obvious that the program is unintelligent. 
It seems plausible to me that the action of parsing the incoming statement and comparing it to 
the various subcategories of possible responses, when it operates at this level of 
sophistication, is the sort of thing we look for when describing intelligence, the possession of a 
mind, or the ability to understand. Since such an improvement is necessary before Block’s 
program could pass a Turing Test, one of his crucial premises – that his machine is obviously 
unintelligent – goes out the window. The ability to manage the list of possible responses with 
sufficient speed requires what could plausibly be called intelligence. 
The second way to speed up the response of the machine is to improve the quality of 
the physical processor so that it can consider more responses in a given amount of time. The 
quality of the processor might be improved by structuring it differently: creating a vast, 
efficient network of connected nodes corresponding to different branches the conversation 
might take, for example. Given the number of nodes required for the one‐hour test, this 
network of nodes would vastly exceed the human brain in complexity – by a thousand orders 
of magnitude. When one considers this massive, complex web of nodes processing inputs and 
producing responses, it becomes less obvious that it is not in fact intelligent. Just as in the case 
above, the key premise that the machine is obviously unintelligent is no longer true. 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Another method of improving the processor is making the processor out of the right 
kind of materials, capable of transmitting signals very quickly, or using the right techniques of 
engineering, to move the necessary physical parts very quickly. The amount of improvement 
necessary on current techniques to sort through a list of sentences ‐ whose number exceeds 
the number of particles in the universe – is so great that I cannot imagine it. The hardware 
which would be capable of such processing would be so far beyond what currently exists that I 
am reluctant to agree that the new, human‐speed machine would be obviously unintelligent, if 
it is even physically possible for it to exist. 
Block addresses this line of reply in his paper. He explains that the physical difficulties 
in realizing his program stem from the physical constants that happen to exist in our universe 
– for instance, the speed of light, number of particles extant, etc. These physical laws, he 
claims, are different from the psychological laws of our universe: 
“But a situation can contravene laws of physics without contravening laws of human 
psychology. For example, in a logically possible world in which gravity obeyed an inverse cube 
law instead of an inverse square law, our laws of physics would be different, but our laws of 
psychology might not be.” (Block, 1981, p. 18) 
He continues: 
“But if my machine does not contravene laws of human psychology‐‐if it exists in a 
possible world in which the laws of human psychology are the same as they are here‐‐then the 
neo‐Turing Test conception of intelligence is false in a world where the laws of human 
psychology are the same as they are here. So the neo‐Turing Test conception of intelligence 
cannot be one of the laws of human psychology.” (Block, 1981, p. 18) 
There are two things I wish to say in reply to this argument. First, I have some 
difficulty accepting the premise that there are universes in which information can be 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transmitted much faster or stored more densely, but that the human intellect does not change 
to reflect this. It seems to me that in universes in which information‐processors happen to be 
much more powerful than in our own, it is natural to expect the human brain to have evolved 
differently in order to benefit from these physical principles. 
Second, even if one grants that there exists a universe in which computing devices can 
have much greater storage and processing power while the human brain remains 
unimproved, this does not affect my position. As I explain in section 4.3, the Turing Test is 
simply a practical method which happens to work in our universe. Thus, Block’s statement of 
the neo‐Turing thesis might be amended to include a disclaimer such as “in this universe”.  
In conclusion, it seems to be a fact that a brute‐force program such as Block’s 
Blockhead is unable to pass for a human in any practical Turing Test – i.e. it will always 
require too much time, and/or be incapable of passing a detailed, long‐term test such as the 
one I advocate. Thus, Block’s Blockhead is not a counterexample to the view I advance in this 
thesis. The inability of the Blockhead to pass an actual test is comparable to the problem with 
Searle’s operator in the Chinese Room – the scale and slowness of these brute‐force 
approaches makes them unsuitable as counterexamples to a functionalist test of 
understanding. 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4  Concessions to Searle 
 
For all of the antagonism it has drawn, Minds, Brains and Programs raises 
extremely interesting and relevant points of discussion. Searle raises cases where one 
might attribute understanding to a program, but ought not to. These facets of his 
argument are worth noting, even if his main thesis is incorrect. These points are:  
1. It is not clear that a program that emulates only some small subset of human 
behaviour does understand by Searle’s definition (which requires the possession 
of a mind) even if the activity the program is duplicating is called 
“understanding” in ordinary parlance (‘understanding’ Chinese, “understanding” 
a story, etc.) 
2. Related to 1, where do we draw the line when attributing understanding? Does a 
calculator understand mathematics, does a thermometer believe that it is cold? Is 
an advocate of the systems reply forced to grant these objects mental states? 
With regard to point 1: Searle’s argument is one that relies on our intuitions about 
minds and understanding. He appeals to our intuitive sense that a system consisting of a 
filing cabinet being manipulated by a clueless operator does not perform the action we call 
“understanding” on the grounds that one of the important components of this system is, in 
fact, a being which is itself capable of understanding.  
It is therefore important to examine what it means for a human to understand, in 
the ordinary sense, because this will inform our intuitions about what we do or do not 
count as instances of this activity. “Understanding”, when applied to humans, is something 
that humans only do with the possession of a full human mind. It is difficult to conceive of 
what it would mean for me to, say, “understand Chinese,” when the only activity that is 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being done by my mind – and ever has been done – is this specific understanding. This 
does not seem compatible with a standard definition of “understand”. In order to shed 
light on the question of what standards one ought to set regarding understanding, we will 
briefly re‐examine Searle’s use of the word. 
 When first mentioning “understanding” Searle specifies: “ ‘Understanding’ implies 
both the possession of mental (intentional) states and the truth (validity, success) of these 
states. For the purposes of this discussion we are concerned only with the possession of 
these states” (Searle, 1980, p.424). He further elaborates: “Intentionality is by definition 
that feature of certain mental states by which they are directed at or about objects and 
states of affairs in the world.”  
Understanding therefore requires the possession of intentional states which relate 
to the world in the proper way. What are the criteria we normally use to grant that these 
states exist? We know that we ourselves have intentionality. Each individual experiences 
their own intentions toward the world, their beliefs about people, objects, states of affairs, 
etc.  We also grant intentionality to other humans on the ground that they display 
behaviour for which the simplest explanation is that they, like ourselves, possess 
intentionality. Searle argues that we should not extend this privilege to digital computers. 
In fact, he specifically argues that “[…] the brain’s causal capacity to produce intentionality 
cannot consist in its instantiating a program, since for any program you like it is possible 
for something to instantiate the program and still not have any mental states” (Searle, 
1980).  
I have given reasons in this paper why we ought not to agree to this premise: our 
opinion that other humans possess intentionality is based on a combination of our own 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experience of intention and the observed behaviour of other humans. Because both the 
brain and the digital computer are simply objects moving through certain physical states, 
there is no compelling reason to believe that a given program is any more incapable of 
mental states than the human brain itself. Searle is basing his argument that no program is 
sufficient for mental states on thought experiments such as the Chinese Room, which I 
have argued are false analogies and do not support his conclusions.   
4.1  Can a Rock Think? 
 
In “The Rediscovery Of the Mind”, Searle argues that there is no clear distinction 
between computation and non‐computation, and that on standard definitions of 
computation any object can be considered a computer executing a program (Searle, 1992). 
The swirl of air molecules in a room could be understood to perform a computation, 
assuming that some interpreter had the correct framework to understand the movements 
of the particles. This argument poses some serious challenges to the functionalist or 
adherent of the intentional stance, because such a person is compelled to grant that 
understanding is literally everywhere, since a complex, Turing‐test‐passing program is 
being executed in any object one cares to choose. The complex motion of water molecules 
in a cup of coffee could be interpreted to be processing any arbitrary inputs one cares to 
choose, and producing the “correct” responses according to some framework (or at least, 
on Searle’s view, this is so). Thus, if one embraces the principle that there exists at least 
one program that is sufficient for understanding, accepting the conclusions of Searle’s 
paper means granting that all objects possess minds and understanding.  
 
 
59 
In response to this challenge, I side with Chalmers’ (1996) reply that although any 
open system can be said to be instantiating any program provided one correctly maps the 
inputs and outputs, a system such as a rock, a cup of coffee, etc. will not be able to 
correctly compute queries other than the specific one addressed by that framework. For 
example, if I had worked out an interpretation by which a lake, when its surface is touched 
at two points, interprets this as the input “two plus two”, and then the resulting ripple 
pattern is understood to mean “four”, then I could not keep the interpretation constant but 
ask a different question and receive a coherent answer. For instance, suppose I wanted to 
instead input the problem “two plus three”, which takes the form of touching the lake 
surface at three different points: the framework I used to calculate “two plus two” would 
no longer produce the correct answer. Every specific question must have its own 
interpretation, and cannot perform an arbitrarily large number of calculations using the 
same constant framework. This is a property which conventional computers, however, do 
possess; I can just as easily solve two plus two as any other basic mathematical operation 
on a given pocket calculator, using the exact same framework for understanding inputs 
and outputs every time. Furthermore, the method by which the calculator is understood to 
be computing the answers does not radically change depending on the problem posed to it 
– unlike the impromptu computers such as those produced by the lake or the cup of coffee 
or the stone. The right “types” of computers to possess understanding or intelligence are 
those that, like the human brain, have a more‐or‐less consistent input‐output format and 
whose methods of calculation are not arbitrary but rather fixed (or “reliable”) in that they 
can be generalized. My particular response to Searle’s argument is not troubled overmuch 
by the possibility that any given object could be said to be implementing any finite 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program, because the standard that I propose as definitive of understanding or the 
possession of a mind is a form of a revised Turing test as outlined in Chapter 3. A 
convincing, long‐term interaction with a human being, including questions on topics 
requiring creativity, memory, and so forth is what I advocate. Such a test might be passed 
given the proper program and a minimally adequate computer. It is, however, difficult to 
envision such a test being foiled by a rock or a cup of coffee which happens to be given a 
framework by which it is understood to be implementing the “mind‐having” program.  
4.2  The Threshold of Understanding 
 
Given Searle’s definition of “understanding”, if one accepts my arguments against 
the Chinese Room, should one therefore reject his position that no program can, of its own 
virtue, produce understanding, even in principle? Yes, absolutely. Is there any conclusion 
worth keeping from Searle’s argument? Again, yes. Searle does score one important 
victory by attempting somewhat to limit the scope of machine “understanding” and 
mental states.  
What other conclusions ought we to draw from the Chinese Room case, if not those 
Searle proposes? Consider Searle’s conclusion that we ought not grant “understanding” to 
a given program merely because its actions appear to emulate some facet of human life. 
While I do not agree with his strong conclusion that no purely formal program could 
produce a mind in virtue of being executed, I do believe a weaker formulation: that the 
criteria for assigning “understanding” ‐ mental states and intention – to an instantiated 
program should be much more specific than those he lays out as the position of “Strong 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AI” in his introduction. The criteria I advocate are, however, still much more permissive 
than those he himself advocates. 
Consider Searle’s first example of a candidate program for “understanding” 
according to Strong AI; the story‐comprehending program from Yale. Should we grant 
mental and intentional states to this program after seeing it in action? The answer is no. 
Despite the program’s remarkable ability to produce correct answers to questions of a 
very specific nature under very specific circumstances, it does not exhibit the kind of 
behaviour that is properly termed “understanding”.  
Harnad expresses similar worries in Minds, Machines and Turing when he describes 
the T1 Turing test, or “toy” model. The “T1” Turing test is a test where the program in 
question is able to duplicate some limited subset of human ability – for example, the 
ability to play chess, but nothing more. Harnad cites Schweizer’s article The Truly Total 
Turing Test in explaining why we ought not to grant understanding to automatons that 
only replicate small fragments of human ability: 
“Toy models, that is, subtotal models, of anything at all, have the liability that they 
have more degrees of freedom than the real, total thing that they are modelling. 
There are always more different ways to generate a fragment of a system’s function 
(say, chess‐playing – or simple harmonic motion) than there are to generate the 
system’s total function (say, everything else a human mind can do – or all of 
Newtonian or Quantum Mechanics), if for no other reason than that the Total 
model must subsume all the functions of the subtotal toy models too.” (Schweizer, 
1998). 
 
This position has direct implications for Searle’s choice of example: we should be 
cautious of saying of the Chinese‐speaking program that it understands Chinese. Suppose 
for instance that Bob is a human whose outward behaviour was exactly that of the story 
understanding program: he has no initiative, and no ability to hold any sort of 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conversation or interaction outside the context of being fed a short story followed by 
questions. As observers, it would not be obvious to us that Bob did in fact understand 
much of anything. Even his behaviour in answering the questions is of such a narrow 
scope (he could not, presumably, answer such questions as “What would you like for 
lunch?” or “Why are you only answering questions about that story?”). Bob would be a 
sort of extreme idiot savant, and we might be hesitant to correlate his robotic, narrow 
replies with genuine understanding. Unlike a human who is highly specialized, Bob would 
not only be incompetent in areas beyond his expertise, he would be completely unable to 
function. For added clarity, imagine Bob’s capabilities were not those of the story‐
analyzing program, but rather a simple chess program, or calculator program. Bob’s 
inability to perform any activity outside of playing chess or performing mathematical 
problems would hint at some sort of bizarre mental hard‐wiring for a specific task rather 
than what we consider understanding. If programs such as these do not qualify as 
understanding, then naturally we will also rule out absurd cases such as those brought up 
by Searle when he criticizes McCarthy’s 1979 paper “Philosophical perceptives in artificial 
intelligence” (Searle, 1980), e.g. cases such as thermostats having beliefs (therefore mental 
states) about the temperature, etc.  Even a relatively complex program such as Schank’s 
story‐question‐answerer fails to unambiguously appear to understand much of anything. 
A human who was only able to shout out the ambient temperature every few seconds 
while otherwise being comatose might also have difficulty qualifying as understanding 
anything. 
What do these cases show? Intentionality in the sense used by Searle is something 
we humans tend to ascribe to those whose behaviour leads us to infer that they are beings 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who have a mental existence like our own. In the case of humans we are quick to grant 
understanding because we reason that all humans, having similar brains, will possess 
intentionality as the rule rather than the exception. The simplest explanation for other 
humans demonstrating this complex behaviour is that, like oneself, they possess 
understanding. Given the great number of humans who display the signs of possessing 
understanding, we grant it to other humans as a matter of course. Therefore our starting 
point for granting understanding ought to be, as Turing proposed, a test to see if a given 
entity can pass itself off as a human mind through sustained interaction. We grant other 
humans mental states on the basis of their presumed ability to demonstrate the full range 
of human behaviour; therefore this standard ought to be sufficient for any other being.  
Thus, we ought to be very wary of saying of a program that it possesses 
intentionality unless it is capable of passing for a human under Turing Test conditions. 
Searle argues that even a Turing test is insufficient to demonstrate intentionality in a case 
in which we are dealing with a symbol‐manipulating program, but I have offered reasons 
why this position is unwarranted. A program such as Alicia, which can carry on 
conversations at length on many topics, which consistently forms friendships and 
relationships, and which has likes and dislikes and tastes in books and films, should be 
granted intentionality for the same reasons that we grant it to any of our human 
acquaintance. On the other hand, in the case of a thermostat, calculator or even constructs 
such as a story‐understanding program or a language‐translating program, this condition 
is not met. These objects and programs cannot pass themselves off as humans in 
prolonged interaction, and so we do not grant them the status of “understanding beings,” 
even though they can duplicate some fragment of human behaviour or ability. A Turing 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Test (over an appropriate time frame and with competent judges) is the minimum 
criterion to conclusively establish the presence of intentionality/understanding in a given 
entity. 
That said, is it possible that we could grant understanding to something/someone 
who demonstrates less mental ability than required for a Turing Test? There seem to be a 
number of counter‐examples to this standard, cases that suggest that beings ought to be 
considered to have understanding, but who would likely fail a Turing test. I will briefly 
examine a few such cases. 
First, consider a human who chooses not to speak, or who speaks very little. A 
particularly reserved and taciturn human might well fail a Turing test. Should we deny 
them understanding? The answer is no. As I have mentioned above, humans possess a 
special status as beings possessing understanding because any human has their own 
mental experiences as a guideline for the subjective experience of being human, and 
therefore can imagine the thoughts and intentions of a human who chooses to remain 
silent. Furthermore, there are of course an overwhelming number of instances of humans 
demonstrating intelligent behaviour requiring intentionality, such that we conclude by 
induction that all living humans have intentionality by default. In the case of a silent and 
reserved human, we infer by application of Occam’s Razor that they have understanding. 
In the case, for example, of a powerful computer running a speech program that never 
produces a response, we have no such grounds for assuming that it possesses 
understanding. Unlike cases involving other humans, we do not in this case have pre‐
existing evidence that any given computer is capable of understanding, or that computers 
more generally act in a way the requires understanding. What’s more, we cannot use our 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own subjective experiences as sometimes silent humans to imagine what an unresponsive 
computer might be thinking. Thus, for practical reasons, we require computers to speak 
and to interact in a familiar (human‐like) way, and we would be unjustified in granting 
understanding to non‐communicative computers as to non‐communicative humans. 
Second, consider a non‐human animal that demonstrates complex and apparently 
intentional behaviour, but is not capable of communicating in the usual human ways. For 
instance, might we be justified in concluding that a dolphin has intentionality? The case of 
a seemingly intelligent animal is a delicate one due to the slippery slope that is entailed 
when one grants intelligence to a single non‐human animal. I daresay it is obvious that 
such animals as dolphins, most types of whales, cats, dogs, primates, etc. do indeed 
possess intentionality and thus understanding. As evidence to support this assertion I 
offer the many experiments in psychology which demonstrate an apparent capacity on the 
part of these animals to perform abstract reasoning, apply induction, solve various 
puzzles, communicate with humans, etc. as evidence that at least some non‐humans have 
mental states “[…which] are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world.” 
(Searle, 1980, Notes – defining “intentionality”). A dog performing a complex series of 
tricks in order to receive affection, an octopus learning to unscrew a man‐made jar 
containing a crab, and a magpie recognizing its own image in a mirror (Prior, Schwarz, et 
al. 2008) all appear to possess beliefs about the world and themselves qualifying as 
intentional. Judging animals to possess understanding of a sort in higher‐order cases such 
as these and others is easy to accept, but as one moves down the continuum of animal 
intelligence, it becomes increasingly difficult to estimate to what degree the observed 
behaviour constitutes intentionality. Consider, for example, the jellyfish. This animal may 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react to stimuli and even appear to make decisions of a sort, but it lacks a brain altogether, 
and demonstrates only the most minimal awareness of its environment and does not 
appear to possess any ability whatsoever to reason, nor does it appear to hold any beliefs 
whose consequences extend past instantaneous reactions. Moving up the scale to such 
animals as shrimp, insects, small fish, birds, and various rodents, there must come a point 
at which one begins to grant intention to what is observed. I believe that since it is 
impossible to formulate an accurate, objective standard for the possession of 
intentionality that can cover beings unable to communicate with humans, the assignment 
of intentionality among such animals is subjective, with some cases lying clearly on one 
side or the other of any plausible delineation –with gorillas and similar primates clearly 
possessing at least a minimal understanding, the sea anemone or venus flytrap possessing 
none. How does this conclusion affect our position on the possibility of an intentional 
program? For one, it indicates that we ought to grant understanding to some beings that 
are not capable of communicating with humans and therefore could not pass the Turing 
test. Does this mean that we should be willing to grant intentionality to some computer‐
run programs that cannot pass the Turing test? As in the case of uncommunicative 
humans, I believe we are justified in holding a double standard for programs and 
biological creatures. We know that animals possess biological brains relatively similar to 
our own: we recognize what appear to be human emotions and attitudes in animals 
(greed, fear, joy, love). We possess a wealth of experimental evidence about the 
adaptability and ability to perform minimal reasoning and abstraction possessed by 
various animals under changing conditions. Our belief that animals possess mental states 
is strengthened by induction; we know that we think, and for reasons outlined above, we 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conclude that other humans think. When we encounter an animal whose brain appears 
similar to ours, and whose behaviour is sufficiently familiar, we grant that it likely 
possesses an understanding at least minimally similar to ours. We do not extend this same 
courtesy to programs because we are naturally suspicious of their ability to understand 
the world as we do due to their very different “brains”, and also because we are generally 
unable to have the same depth of non‐verbal communication with a program as with, say, 
a dog. An animal possessing a familiar body has the advantage of being able to 
communicate its thoughts and desires through body language which resembles our own, 
something that naturally computer‐instantiated programs will tend to lack. Nevertheless, 
if a computer‐controlled robot were produced that could reliably display the same depth 
of behaviour and adaptability as an animal candidate for the capability to understand, 
then we ought to at least consider the possibility that it may be capable of understanding. 
How we ought to test such beings as robotic dogs and the like ‐ those that communicate 
with humans in ways not suitable for a Turing test but that might still convey 
intentionality ‐ is beyond the scope of this paper. I acknowledge only that such a test 
would of necessity be difficult to devise and agree upon, and that it is in principle possible 
for such a being to understand on the grounds that it appears possible for such animals as 
dogs or dolphins to qualify also. 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